Legal Potentials Conference 2025

by Raymond Rasser and Paulina Rundel

In its third instalment, the Ars Iuris Legal Potentials Conference 2025 addressed an evergreen topic of legal theory relevant to all legal disciplines: legal entities. The title “Constructing Legal Entities: On Persons, Corporations and States” hinted at what attendees could anticipate: A broad range of perspectives on legal subjectivity, its construction and shortcomings of contemporary legal frameworks.

The speakers – thoughtfully chosen by the organizing Ars Iuris fellows Ellen Hagedorn, Lorenz Handstanger, Celina Saci and Cornelia Tscheppe – delivered thought-provoking presentations that sparked lively debates.

Held in the heart of Vienna, the event stood out for the academic rigor and the exemplary organization. The event’s success was made possible by the relentless efforts of the organizing fellows and Mary Barrett, Donat Binder, Lana Krug and Lisa Ladstätter from the Ars Iuris team, supported by the Speaker of Ars Iuris, Professor Franz-Stefan Meissel.

The conference opened with a keynote lecture by Professor Stephan Kirste (Paris Lodron University Salzburg), who addressed two fundamental questions regarding legal entities and their place in our legal framework: “Why do norms need subjects and why do subjects need norms?” To answer these questions, Kirste began by defining norms as prescriptive propositions, which command or permit actions, unlike descriptive propositions, which merely describe facts. Norms express obligations, which only make sense if they address entities capable of action. Therefore, Kirste argued, norms presuppose the existence of subjects.

According to Kirste, legal norms differ from other types of norms, as they are enacted and enforceable through legal procedures. Furthermore, the law does not assume the existence of subjects but creates them through legal norms. By doing so, Kirste explained, the law enables and limits subjects’ freedom to act and illustrated that A has a right to act, while B has a duty to tolerate that action. This framework ensures the recognition of each person’s freedom, allowing private autonomy. Additionally, Kirste argued the law also enables public autonomy by allowing subjects to participate in the creation of the legal norms that govern them. At this point of the presentation, it became clear that the relation between the law and its subjects is one of reciprocal dependency; legal norms require legal subjects as they are both their authors and addressees. Legal subjects require legal norms as their legal status and actions do not come naturally but are the product of a legal procedure.

Following Kirste’s keynote, the first panel of speakers – moderated by Ellen Hagedorn (University of Vienna) – explored key issues of legal personhood. All panellists emphasised shortcomings of a legal framework that associates a kind of “humanness” with its subjects, making it ill-suited to address non-human entities such as corporations or animals.

Is it possible to construct a concept of dignity and legal subjectivity that includes vulnerable groups such as animals? In “Subjects out of Compassion: A Conscience-Based Justification of Legal Subjectivity”, Isa Bilgen (University of Potsdam) argued that this is indeed possible. Bilgen first highlighted the shortcomings of the traditional, Kantian concept of dignity, which remains closely intertwined with our understanding of legal subjectivity. He argued that this concept is plagued by an anthropocentric narrowness, since beings only have dignity insofar as they are rational and autonomous subjects. Bilgen then proposed a new definition of dignity, rooted in vulnerability rather than strength. Conscience was central to Bilgen’s endeavour. He understood conscience as a mediator between reason and nature: once a being’s vulnerability is recognised as worthy of protection by a conscience entity, the being gains subjectivity. Conscience – activated by compassion – thereby creates subjectivity. Bilgen claimed that this approach overcomes the narrowness of classical dignity theories and paves the way for a more inclusive understanding of legal subjectivity.

Next, panellist Alexandru Silaghi (University of Vienna) analysed an Austrian discourse that had previously been surprisingly unstructured and underdeveloped, namely the debate on the fundamental rights status of legal entities. In his presentation, “Rationalising the Discourse on Personae Morales as Addressees of Fundamental Rights Provisions within the Framework of Austrian Law”, he managed to bring greater clarity to this field. The question at the heart of Silaghi’s project is whether corporations can invoke fundamental rights and, if so, which ones and on what legal basis? The Austrian constitution provides little to no guidance. Additionally, the Austrian Constitutional Court has failed to clarify the issue, having extended certain fundamental rights to legal entities without offering any methodological reasoning. Silaghi examined the scholarly debate surrounding this unclear status quo. Many scholars have argued that legal persons can only hold those fundamental rights that can “by their nature” apply to them. Silaghi criticised this “essential nature” argument as vague and ultimately empty, concealing subjective value judgements. Silaghi therefore called for methodological clarity; to rationalise the discussion, legal scholars must return to their methodological toolbox. Legal uncertainty, he argued, must be met with clarity via textual, historical, teleological and systematic reasoning – an endeavour he intends to pursue in his doctoral thesis.

The panel concluded with Naomie Dieudonné (University of Neuchâtel) on “The Legal Personality of Animals in Switzerland: A Historical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Construction of Legal Subjectivity for Non-Human Entities." Dieudonné began her interactive presentation by posing a seemingly simple yet central question: whether animals are to be understood as persons or as objects. Historically, animals have been treated as legal objects, even though, Dieudonné argued, other disciplines suggest that animals are sentient beings, challenging their legal classification. Consequently, legislators have begun discussing the possibility of redefining animals’ legal status. The centrepiece of Dieudonné’s presentation was Switzerland’s attempt to rethink the legal status of animals. She guided the audience through a Swiss legislative journey. The Swiss case and its rather underwhelming result highlighted how emotionally charged the topic of legal subjectivity remains. Nevertheless, the case offered valuable lessons. Legislative changes are possible, even if they challenge established concepts like the human-centred legal framework. Reform must engage with public opinion, as democratic legitimacy is crucial for enduring change.

After a short coffee break, Panel B – moderated by Lorenz Handstanger (University of Vienna) – explored how the Global North has historically constructed and continues to construct subjectivity. Both panellists critically analysed colonial concepts and their enduring influence on historical and contemporary depictions of “otherness”.

First, Lara Torbay (University of Fribourg) presented on “Constitutional Law and Development Cooperation: Benevolence as Nation-Building and the Construction of the Global South Order.” She analysed how national development law participates in constructing legal subjectivity of Global North and South subjects. Torbay began by introducing post-development theory, which views development as a discourse that depicts the Global South as dependent and underdeveloped and the Global North as its saviour. This discourse, she argued, perpetuates colonial relations. Focusing on the role of law in institutionalising development discourse, Torbay examined Switzerland’s development law as a case study. She showed how Switzerland has used development discourse to transform its image on the international stage into that of a benevolent donor. At the end of her presentation, Torbay raised the critical question: Is all development law therefore inherently bad? Whilst addressing this, she outlined two key critiques of development law: first, portraying some countries as benevolent givers inherently paints others as dependent, thereby reproducing a colonial worldview. Second, an overemphasis on seeming charitable leads states to favour symbolic gestures over real reform.

Next, Koloman Roiger-Simek (University of Vienna) presented on “Human Rights: Defining Humanity in the Americas of the 15th and 16th Centuries.” Roiger-Simek investigated how European colonial concepts echoed ancient frameworks and hierarchies. He argued that the European depictions of Indigenous peoples as “uncivilised cannibals” – used to justify their exploitation – can be read as a continuation of long-standing historical patterns. Roiger-Simek also highlighted early efforts by the Church and royal decrees towards recognising the humanity of the Indigenous peoples, marking first steps toward today’s concept of universal human dignity. Although Roiger-Simek’s topic may at first glance appear removed from contemporary debates on human dignity, he successfully demonstrated its continuous relevance. In particular, the depiction of the “civilised, benevolent West” and the “uncivilised, dependent South”, a dichotomy previously criticised by Torbay, can be linked to these colonial frameworks. Roiger-Simek’s analysis served as a powerful reminder that the legacy of colonialism is not confined to the past. It continues to shape contemporary views of “otherness”, subjectivity and human dignity, influencing how societies understand humanity today.

Re-energised by the delicious organic vegetarian lunch with lively discussions on the morning’s presentations, the afternoon continued with Panel C, moderated by Cornelia Tscheppe (University of Vienna). The session brought together three presentations on how global legal frameworks construct and constrain corporate, economic and criminal responsibility.

Xia Li (University of Basel) opened the panel with a presentation on “Constructing Corporate Legal Subjectivity: Upstream Supply Chains, the Brussels Effect, and China’s Counter-Legislation.” Using the BMW Group Supplier Code of Conduct as a case study, she showed how such codes are evolving from soft ethical commitments into binding contractual obligations. Against the backdrop of instruments such as the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG), the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), Li argued that this shift exemplifies a broader Brussels Effect: EU human rights and environmental standards are increasingly exported through global supply contracts to foreign companies. Her typological analysis of Chinese case law further highlighted the frictions that arise when these European due diligence requirements “travel” into China’s domestic legal order, including its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and foreign relations framework. By doing so, her analysis revealed asymmetries of bargaining power, frequent recourse to domestic courts and growing risks for international supply chains. Finally, she called for greater legal clarity and cross-jurisdictional coherence.

Subsequently, Param Bhalerao (University of Vienna) turned to the conceptual foundations of investors’ substantive rights in his presentation titled “Constructing Investors’ Substantive Rights in International Investment Law.” He began by tracing the evolution of the individual’s status from a mere “object” in a state-centric system in international law, with their interests pursued, if at all, through diplomatic protection. Investment treaties, he explained, emerged to move individuals closer to the status of “subjects”, yet they still leave unresolved how investors’ rights should be conceptualised today. On this basis, Bhalerao contrasted two perspectives. The first approach discussed was a derivative-rights approach, under which investors simply step into the procedural shoes of their home states. The second approach addressed was the direct-rights approach, which treats investors as independent rights-holders. Drawing on arbitral practice such as Corn Products v. Mexico and Occidental v. Ecuador, he showed how this seemingly abstract distinction has concrete implications – for instance, who may waive arbitration rights and whether countermeasures in inter-state disputes can justify breaches vis-à-vis investors. Throughout his presentation, Bhalerao repeatedly returned to his guiding question, “Whose right is it anyway?”, highlighting that the answer remains far from straightforward.

Closing the conference, Muhammad Rioviano (University of Wrocław) explored “Challenges in Establishing Criminal Liability of Private Military Companies under the International Criminal Law Regime.” He examined the jurisdictional and practical obstacles to prosecuting private military contractors (PMCs) before the International Criminal Court (ICC), particularly under its “two-track” policy for joint investigations and the frequent overlap between domestic and international proceedings. Rioviano noted that the Rome Statute’s emphasis on individual criminal responsibility fails to capture the complex corporate structures of PMCs, which blur lines of attribution and accountability. Analysing the potential liability of directors and senior managers under Articles 25 and 28 of the Statute, he highlighted the difficulty of assigning responsibility within such hierarchies. Drawing on examples such as the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa and Ukraine, as well as earlier PMC activities in Sierra Leone and Venezuela, he proposed a “double-dealing approach” that combines domestic enforcement measures with international criminal prosecution. Moreover, he called for renewed debate on whether the Rome Statute should explicitly incorporate corporate criminal liability for contemporary warfare-related crimes.

In the final Q&A, participants returned to the overarching theme of legal subjectivity and responsibility. As one participant, Melani Dumancic (University of Vienna), aptly observed: “It’s fascinating how many different angles there are from which to explore the question of legal subjectivity – and who or what should be recognised as the bearer of rights.”

The conference concluded with a convivial get-together, where participants exchanged impressions and ideas inspired by the day’s wide-ranging debates on how law constructs and defines legal entities – from compassion-based accounts of legal subjectivity and animals’ legal personality, to development cooperation, human rights and the construction of the “Global South”, to the role of private actors in international investment, corporate and criminal law. Thanks to the dedicated organising team of Ars Iuris Vienna and the Vienna Law Review, the Legal Potentials Conference once again proved to be a lively forum for young scholars to explore how law constructs, empowers, and constrains the entities that shape our world.

Readers who wish to learn more about the presenters’ topics and engage more closely with these debates will soon be able to do so in a special issue of the Vienna Law Review dedicated to the conference contributions.