Summary
In recent years, the term “woke” has been used as a pejorative to delegitimize identity politics. Critiques of identity politics are brought forth both by liberals and by those who fundamentally challenge the liberal tradition in political thought. According to liberal Francis Fukuyama, identity politics centers on demanding public recognition for an intrinsically valuable authentic inner self. Thus, identity politics gives rise to what we would call “identity narcissism”: an overriding concern with one’s own identity as opposed to a shared project of living together across difference. Anti-liberal political philosopher Patrick Deneen worries that identity politics consists in a “dissolution of social norms”. These social norms serve as “guardrails” for “ordinary people”, and thereby provide them with the orientation necessary to create a meaningful life.
In identity politics, Fukuyama and Deneen believe to have identified the driving force behind many contemporary progressive political movements. However, “identity politics” in its influential formulation by the Black feminist Combahee River Collective is not about demanding recognition for one’s authentic identity. It refers to a social group struggling against its own oppression – whether that oppression consists in marginalization by cultural stereotypes, law, or the unequal distribution of resources. We propose to term Fukuyama and Deneen’s object of critique “wokeism”. Though “being woke” may refer to being aware of all kinds of oppression, one of its aspects is certainly being aware of the fate of those whose way of life differs from what is socially dominant. Thus, a “woke” politics of the authentic self can be interpreted as a political project seeking to change socially dominant ways of life to accommodate difference.
Based on the liberal principles of autonomy and neutrality, we argue that there is one defensible version of woke law, that is, law which supports wokeism. This argument consists of two claims. First, woke law enables individual autonomy. Autonomy presupposes emotional-intellectual capabilities. One such capability is what Robin Dillon calls “basal self-respect”: “the unexpressed and unquestioned […] assumption that it is good that I am”. The experience of basal self-respect presupposes the experience of having your way of life recognized, even if it is different from what is socially dominant. If law is to enable individual autonomy, it must support projects which struggle for the recognition of ways of life which differ from what is socially dominant and provide individuals with the experiences of recognition necessary to develop basal self-respect. Thus, it must be woke. Second, pursuant to the liberal principle of neutrality, the state must not directly value particular ways of life over others. However, law can enable others who value ways of life which differ from what is socially dominant to communicate this effectively. That is, it may provide the material conditions for communicating recognition. It may even do so differentially and provide higher support for the communication of recognition to those who are at higher risk of being deprived of it, and hence need it for their autonomy. In this case, we argue, law would be meaningfully woke and remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good.
This conception of wokeism and woke law can survive the critiques of Fukuyama and Deneen. In Fukuyama’s view, wokeism and woke law encourage what we have termed “identity narcissism”. This might be the case if wokeism were the only thing progressive politics pursues but we do not suggest that. Moreover, we agree that wokeism and woke law ought not to demand others to appreciate particular ways of life. In Deneen’s view, wokeism would undermine the guiding function of social norms. Of course, our conception of wokeism and woke law is not destructive of social norms as such, but Deneen is right that it would undermine the status of social norms which define what is normal in a given society. However, this is as it should be. If Deneen thinks that normalcy is important, it is because he thinks that there is one specific way of life which is right for humans. We disagree.
Bio: Lisa Chi
Lisa Chi is a PhD student and university assistant at the Department of Legal Philosophy at the University of Vienna. Her research focuses on autonomy and topics within Legal Gender and Queer Studies.
Bio: Christian Demmelbauer
Christian Demmelbauer is a PhD student and university assistant at the Department of Legal Philosophy at the University of Vienna. His research focuses on illiberal political philosophy and civil disobedience.
