by Lisa Steurer
„What can we see here?” By inviting us to contemplate Velazquez’s Las Meninas and reflect on how points of view may vary depending on one’s perspective, Leonardo Raznovich laid the foundation for what would be an engaging journey into American legal thinking.
Starting with his lecture on May 15th, Dr. Raznovich provided us with a first theoretical framework for approaching the interpretation of U.S. (case) law. Beginning with classical legal theorists – who believe in the possibility of always finding “the right decision” based on a conception of law as an end in itself – we then moved on to Legal Realism and the role of policy choices in legal interpretation. Building on that, we explored the Legal Process School, with its focus on the importance of institutions, mechanisms, and rules of interpretation. We then turned to Dworkin’s moral reading, discussing the differences between moral principles and policy goals, as well as the constraints that accompany a moral approach to interpretation. Against this background, Dr. Raznovich concluded the lecture by showing how, from the perspective of Critical Legal Studies, none of these theories sufficiently explain or justify the repressions and distortions of law and how, paradoxically, an awareness of how ideology shapes judicial and legislative decisions may offer a kind of certainty about the trajectory of legal developments in current political climates.
In Dr. Raznovich’s workshop on the following day, we put our newly acquired knowledge into practice by examining a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. We began with the Court’s 1896 judgement in Plessy v Ferguson, which upheld racial segregation in the United States, and Brown v Board of Education where this doctrine was overturned nearly 60 years later. We then moved on to Bowers v Hardwick, Roe v Wade, and Lawrence v Texas and Dobbs respectively – cases addressing LGBTQI+ and women’s rights. Among other things, our discussion focused on the effects of dissenting opinions and the significant impact the Court’s framing of issues has on legal reasoning and public perception. Finally, at the example of United States v Zubaydah, Trump v United States and the so-called “Spoiled Cantaloupes” case, we discussed the Supreme Court’s view on separation of powers, as well as the scope of discretion and authority granted to administrative bodies.
Over the course of these two sessions, Dr. Raznovich successfully managed to open our minds to legal thinking beyond the continental canon of interpretation and to engage us in discussions on fundamental questions about legal reasoning and interpretation.
